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BROKEN GOVERNMENTS ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: 
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INFRASTRUCTURES?  
 
Anne Meuwese* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
EU-related procedures around ‘policy information’ or ‘regulatory information’ 
provide clues for possible new directions in attempts to improve such 
information and its use in the United States government. This Article presents 
two “information infrastructures” as the best shots at infusing political 
legislative process with regulatory analysis without technocratizing them and 
regulatory cooperation as an additional check on regulatory policies. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The kind of comprehensive study of fault lines in the policy-making 
process that Peter Schuck has undertaken for his book Why Government 
Fails So Often has never been carried out in the context of the European 
Union (EU). But if public opinion is to be taken as a relevant indicator  
of government failure, Schuck’s diagnosis certainly applies to Europe as 
well. Although EU leadership’s approval ratings recovered somewhat from 
the dire situation in 2013 when there were only four EU countries with a 
clear majority approving, a 2015 poll suggested there is only one country 
(Ireland) where a majority thinks EU membership has left it better off.1 
Peter Schuck rightly states that a multi-jurisdictional comparison would 
make the exercise of pinpointing the drivers for government failure 
unmanageably complex.2  
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, the “brutal facts of public life” differ of 
course, as does the institutional context.  To mention just one anomaly that 
complicates comparisons of EU-US policy performance: the EU institutions 
heavily rely on regulatory powers that have been ‘delegated’ to the supra-
																																								 																				
*Anne Meuwese is Professor of European and Comparative Law at Tilburg Law School of 
Tilburg University in the Netherlands. 
1 Jan Sonnenschein & Sofia Kluch, EU Leadership Regains Approval Across Europe, 
GALLUP (March 2, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181772/leadership-regains-approval-
across-europe.aspx; Anna Manchin, EU Leadership Approval at Record Low in Spain, 
Greece (January 8, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/166757/leadership-approval-record-
low-spain-greece.aspx.  
2 PETER SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENTS FAIL SO OFTEN 18-19 (2014). 
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national level; for public spending or infrastructural projects it mostly  
has to rely on member states.3 The frequent references to policy experiences 
from abroad, and Europe in particular, throughout Why Government Fails So 
Often,4 do show though that on concrete issues comparison is useful,  
as long as it occurs with a sufficient dose of contextual sensibility. A  
good reason to explore a comparison ‘light’ further is that, the EU may have 
something to offer exactly because of its ongoing legitimacy and performance 
crisis. Due to the (increasing) sense that European integration may not be 
inevitable and let alone ‘ever closer’, EU institutions have had relatively strong 
incentives for experimenting with institutional ‘fixes’ for policy failure.  
 Schuck concludes that among a multitude of solutions that are 
unfeasible because the systemic drivers of government failure they target are 
so deeply rooted, the one element that can be improved quite easily and 
relatively cheaply is ‘policy information’.5 Since this assertion tallies with the 
European experience, this brief commentary focuses on this particular aspect 
and proposes two developments involving the EU that are worth keeping an 
eye on for anyone interested in incremental improvement of the informational 
input into policy-making and legislative processes.  
 
II. POLITICS AND REGULATORY IMPACT INFORMATION 
 
 An example of an ‘informational solution’ is presented in the final 
chapter of Why Government Fails So Often, where a legislative checklist for 
Congressional Committees to use in order to ensure that their statutes avoid the 
worst mistakes is proposed.6 This hints on the one hand at a wish to involve 
Congress more in ‘evidence-based lawmaking’ and on the other at a resignation 
to fairly modest ambitions in this regard (‘avoiding the worst mistakes’). Odd 
as it may seem, in the light of the aforementioned legitimacy crisis, to look to 
the European Union for hints on how to improve regulatory information 
structures there are policy areas where regulation at the EU level has been 
relatively successful. One of those is environmental protection of which the 
Clean Air for Europe Thematic Strategy from 2005 is a good example.7  
																																								 																				
3 GEONDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE 2-3 (1996). 
4 See SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 384 (describing the Danish policy experience with housing 
programs). 
5 Id. at 391. 
6 Id. at 381. 
7 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - 
Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution, COM (2005) 446 final (Sept. 21, 2005); Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Ambient Air Quality and 
Cleaner Air for Europe, COM (2005) 447 final (Sept. 21, 2005).  
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 A recent study found that because of specific EU policies to reduce air 
pollution across Europe, in combination with new technologies, 80,000 deaths 
are prevented each year and there is a 35% reduction of fine particles in the 
atmosphere over the last 40 years.8 In the case of European clean air policies, 
the particular European brand of regulatory impact analysis can be credited 
with at least a small part of the success. The most eye-catching difference 
between the American and European toolkits for regulatory analysis is that at 
the EU level legislative bills that need approval from the European Parliament 
undergo an impact assessment as well. The initial assessment is carried out by 
the European Commission, the sole institution empower to initiate legislation, 
but the European Parliament committed to additionally assessing the impacts 
whenever it introduces substantial amendments.9 This latter element exactly 
has not gotten off the ground too well, but the procedure is managing better 
than any other in the world to engage a parliament in a discourse of impacts or 
at the very least to have turned the idea that a parliament should care about the 
evidence base of legislation into a mainstream one. Simplifying somewhat, a 
unique combination of methodology and presentation is at the core of this 
achievement. Paragraph 14 of the 2016 version of the Interinstitutional 
Agreement on Better Law-making states the following: 
 
The European Parliament and the Council, upon considering 
Commission legislative proposals, will take full account of 
the Commission's impact assessments. To that end, impact 
assessments shall be presented in such a way as to facilitate 
the consideration by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the choices made by the Commission. 
 
 One concrete way in which the presentation of regulatory impact 
information is facilitating consideration by the political decision-makers is the 
‘best practice’ of reporting on the findings of the impact analysis in a ‘decision 
matrix’. In the more than ten years that the European Union has been 
experimenting with impact assessment it has become a champion of multi-
																																								 																				
8 S. T. Turnock et al, The Impact of European Legislative and Technology Measures to 
Reduce Air Pollutants on Air Quality, Human Health and Climate, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, 
Feb. 2016. 
9 Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making between the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Commission, 2016 O.J. (L 123) 1 
(stipulating that “[t]he European Parliament and the Council will, when they consider this to 
be appropriate and necessary for the legislative process, carry out impact assessments in 
relation to their substantial amendments to the Commission's proposal”). A very similar 
agreement had been in place since 2003.  
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criteria analysis. Multi-criteria analysis evolved from critique of conventional 
cost benefit, its main strengths being that it escapes the inherent uncertainties 
linked with monetization and that it weighs up multiple options and competing 
interests using numerous decision criteria.10 European regulatory policy 
explicitly allows for a variety of decision criteria, on the grounds that mandatory 
efficiency-based decision-making would be in violation of the treaties.  
 The argument here would not be that multi-criteria analysis is inherently 
superior to cost-benefit analysis – which in many cases still takes center stage – 
but that because it offers greater opportunities to highlight trade-offs involved 
in policy-making. This happens in the aforementioned matrix, which shows 
how different options perform in relation to different criteria (efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, fundamental rights, coherence…). For instance, the impact 
assessment produced by the European Commission on the Clean Air for Europe 
Thematic Strategy in the succinct presentation of the aggregated effects, clearly 
distinguished between overall efficiency (i.e. the greatest net-benefits to 
European society) and cost-effectiveness.11 The discussion that followed 
between the European Commission and the European Parliament regarding the 
appropriate ambition level of the new policy was prompted by this way of 
presenting regulatory impact information. 
 Of course, many counter-anecdotes can be found in the European 
experience, which I am – I cannot emphasize this enough – not presenting for 
its perfection, but for its potential on some very specific points. The Clean 
Air Strategy Example merely shows that multi-criteria analysis can be a good 
starting point for data-based accountability mechanisms involving political 
decision-makers. It allows or presenting options when reporting on the basis 
for legislative or regulatory policy choices, which offers an opening for actual 
political engagement whilst simultaneously framing the terms in which the 
final decision would need to be explained.  
 Certainly, a further defining feature of the European policy process is 
that procedures for ‘legislation’ and ‘rule-making’ are much more similar 
than in the US, for a start each involving the European Commission and the 
European Parliament, albeit in different roles. I do not suggest that it is 
feasible in the short term for the US Congress to all of a sudden start taking 
note of decision matrixes; the anecdote and brief explanation of the European 
preference for the use of multi-criteria analysis in impact analysis process 
merely demonstrates that, beyond the checklist idea, well designed ‘infor-
mation infrastructures’ may stand a chance in the longer term. 
																																								 																				
10 OLIVIER VARDAKOULIAS, NEW ECON. FOUND., ECONOMICS IN POLICY-MAKING BRIEFING 
6: MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS 2 (2013), http://www.neweconomics.org/page/-/publications/ 
Economics_in_policymaking_Briefing_6.pdf.  
11 Annex to: The Communication on Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution and The Directive 
on “Ambient Air Quality and Cleaner Air for Europe,” SEC (2005) 1133 (Sept. 21, 2005). 
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III. REGULATORY COOPERATION AND A NEW TYPE  
OF POLICY INFORMATION 
 
 The term ‘information infrastructure’ is also applicable to a second 
development with an underexplored potential for regulatory policy learning: 
horizontal regulatory cooperation between the EU and the US as currently 
driven by the negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The trade-driven need to coordinate regulatory policies 
may lead to a shared forum for discussing regulatory policies that may 
include a variety of public policy considerations far beyond trade. In a recent 
special issue of Law & Contemporary Problems on regulatory cooperation 
Alberto Alemanno and Jonathan Wiener have argued in favor of learning 
from transatlantic regulatory variation.12 What could this look like in more 
concrete terms? The European Commission now systematically publishes 
negotiation texts, including recently a chapter on shared Good Regulatory 
Practices.13 One example of a proposal for a shared practice is on the type of 
impact analysis both the US and the EU would commit to carry out on 
‘regulatory acts’:  
 
When carrying out a regulatory impact assessment […] each 
Party shall ensure that it: 
 
a. considers the need for the proposed regulatory act  
and the nature and the significance of the problem the 
regulatory act is intended to address; 
b. examines feasible regulatory and non-regulatory 
alternatives (including the  option of not regulating), if 
any, that would achieve the objective of the regulatory act; 
c. assesses potential short and long term social, economic, 
and environmental impacts of such alternatives and the 
anticipated costs and benefits (quantitative, qualitative, or 
both, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult 
to quantify).14 
 
																																								 																				
12 Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory 
Cooperation: TTIP as a Step Toward a Global Regulatory Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 103 (2015).  
13 EUROPEAN UNION, TTIP-EU Proposal for Chapter: Good Regulatory Practices, in EU-
EU TTIP NEGOTIATIONS (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_1 
54380.pdf.  
14 Id. at art. 8 para. 2-c. 
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 The European Commission wants to include congressional bills in the 
shared definition of ‘regulatory acts’, which matches its own attempts to extend 
evidence-based lawmaking to ‘primary legislative processes’ as discussed 
above. This, however, is very unlikely to be accepted by the US, where agencies 
with rulemaking powers are likely seen as more natural addressees of ‘shared 
regulatory practices’. A further proposed chapter seeks to establish strengthened 
‘rules of the game’ for regulatory cooperation in specialized areas.15 An earlier 
proposal for a ‘Regulatory Cooperation Body’ was aborted, most likely for lack 
of support from the US side, and instead the negotiators are clearly still searching 
for the appropriate institutional framework for ensuring future regulations are 
not (too) incompatible, an endeavor that is hoped to have a more general quality-
enhancing effect too.  
 The negotiation text published by the European Commission shows that 
it is thinking in the direction of offering regulators from the other side early 
opportunities for cooperation and information exchange,16 and a joint 
commitment to take into account each other's approaches on their merits17 
“before we go ahead and regulate.”18 So the idea is not for the US and the EU to 
start drafting regulatory policies together, but rather that the  
mutual commitment to take into account policy frameworks and regulatory ideas 
from the other side of the ocean could serve as an additional test for bias in the 
policy process. Taken to the extreme this could even take the shape of peer 
reviews of regulatory frameworks, but even without such strong 
institutionalization, regulatory cooperation presents an opportunity for a 
different type of information to enter domestic policy processes. Exchanges 
based on regulatory information such as the ones promoted under a possible 
future TTIP could therefore be a valuable addition to the range of sources of 
solutions identified in Why Government Fails So Often. 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The remarks above are intended to echo the call for incrementalism 
from Peter Schuck’s insightful book.19 Rather than using the European 
experiment for expanding or validating Schuck’s already multi-dimensional 
																																								 																				
15 EUROPEAN UNION, TTIP-EU Proposal for Chapter: Regulatory Cooperation, in EU-EU 
TTIP NEGOTIATIONS (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc_1543 
77.pdf.  
16 Id. at art. x.4 para. 2-a. 
17 Id. at art. x.4 para. 2-b. 
18 EUROPEAN COMM’N, REGULATORY COOPERATION IN TTIP: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
EU'S REVISED PROPOSAL 5 (2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/march/tradoc 
154378.pdf.  
19 SCHUCK, supra note 3, at 34. 
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diagnosis of government failure, the aim was to highlight EU-related 
procedures around ‘policy information’ or ‘regulatory information’ that 
provide clues for possible new directions in attempts to improve such 
information and its use. The two ‘information infrastructures’ presented here, 
multi-criteria analysis as our best shot at infusing political legislative process 
with regulatory analysis without technocratizing them and regulatory 
cooperation as an additional check on regulatory policies, are very different 
in nature. One is an almost technical device that is representative for a 
uniquely European style of impact analysis, the other an ideational ‘highway 
in the sky’ across the Atlantic and neither is a catch-all solution for the 
problems Schuck identifies. However, they do represent worthwhile avenues 
for further thinking about solutions geared towards avoiding unnecessary 
policy failures. 
 
